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Edward Horowitz - Home Box Office
Horowitz began by briefly defining satellite jamming
and alluded to the threat this could cause to society if resorted
to by terrorists or even pranksters. He then identified the
different phases in satellite transmission and methods by which
jamming could occur. These are as follows:
- Uplink (as in the Captain Midnight situation)
- Downlink
- Transponder (such as to override or interfere
with an on-going program)
- Move the satellite
- Blow-out the 'satellite tuoe'
Broadly classifying, satellite jamming could be divided into two
types; accidental, and intentional jamming. Most jamming he
said is accidental in nature and takes place in the uplink
portion of transmission. Usually it is caused by inexperienced
operators who while orienting their 'dish' sweep the skies from
one satellite to the other jamming everything. This type of
interference could be tracked down but usually is very temporary.
Horowitz then related the Captain Midnight incident
that occured on April 27th 1986. While HBO was operating as
normal, using a power of 125 watts through a 11 mm antenna (which
is adequate to saturate the transponder), the intruder came in at
about 250 watts in an attempt to "wrestle" the transponder away
from HBO. The technicians on duty operating on standing
instructions jacked-up the broadcast power (in an attempt to
maintain control) upto 200 watts. But the intruder kept
increasing the power of his transmission accordingly. Therefore,
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fearing an over saturation (and subsequent damage) of the
transponder, HBO pulled off the air. Captain Midnight thereby
had the transponder to himself for 4 minutes. The interrupting
message was basically a warning that dish dealers and owners were
not pleased with HBO's scrambling of services since January this
year. However, Horowitz stated that this displeasure was only
among a small portion of dish owners and that primarily because
of misrepresentations on the part of dealers. Aside from this
small group of displeased dish owners the general response to
dish sales and programs have been fairly dramatic - starting with
500 orders per week it is now over 3000 orders per week, with
growth continuing in the right direction.
Referring to discussions a few weeks prior to this
incident with both the White House and the FCC, Horowitz said
that the general response from the government at that time to che
possibility of this kind of threat was negative. He asserted
that jammers are effectively communication terrorists who
undermine tne societal balance. Jamming he said could happen to
anyone anywhere. However, the brighter side of the Captain
Midnight incident is that the FBI and FCC responded immediately
in efforts to track down Captain Midnight and also subsequently
fought for preventive measures. A study of the recording enabled
them to identify the type of signal generator that was used.
Assessing the equipment at various uplink sites and the power
that was used helped narrow down the possible sites from 2000 to
about 200 to 300 and thereby track down the intruder.
Horowitz stated that what was of greater concern
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however was what could happen from a backyard or mobile signal
generator. For less than $5000 a person can put together a
system capable of interfering with the satellite signal and even
degrade the transponder. Since this kind of system could be
built without any record or license, a suggestion made by HBO to
the FCC relates to developing an identifying system.
In summary, Horowitz said that if the situation were to
occur today there are procedures that would allow them to pin-
point within a radius of a few 100 miles about 5 minutes after
the transmission as to where it was coming from. This is done by
allerting a few precesignated satellite carriers and by doing
something at the uplink stage. While they cannot stop it
happening they can find the person quite quickly. In the longer
term he said a new generation of satellites are being developed
that would have adequate protection.
The government he said realizes the vulnerability of
its traffic and has (a) ordered 50,U00 scrambler 'phones - a
moderate level security (not encrypted), (b) installed a fiber
optic network. The military he said, in his opinion, uses
frequency-hopping for security purposes. Satellites he said,
from the commercial perspective, will continue to remain
vulnerable though less than oefore. He was also of the opinion
that in the future satellites would not be used as much as at
present.
Ron Katznelson - M/A-COM, Inc.
Katznelson addressed the issue of satellite jamming
beginning with the history of encryption relating to satellite-
television communication. He stated that M/A-COM initially became
involved by developing 'Videocipher'.
Videocipher I was developed allowing the encryption of
the audio, first by digitizing it and then using DES to encrypt
the bit stream which is placed in the horizontal blanking
interval of the video signal, thus eliminating the need for audio
subcarriers. The video is hard-scrambled by line dicing and
permutation. The system was first tested by HBO around 1983.
However, both HBO and M/A-COM recognized the need for a much lower
cost system to be used as consumer decoders. Since it was not
felt that the consumer business of digital video processing could
economically sustain the cost even though it offered transmission
security, Videocipher II with soft video scrambling was
developed. HBO he said, pioneered the use Videocipher II and
protecting transmission by scrambling in 1985. Actual continuous
scrambling began on January 15th, 1986.
As a result of scrambling and also due to the confusion
a reduction in the TVRO equipment market was anticipated. The
uncertainities caused the reduction in sales of satellite
receivers and dishes, causing an estimated loss of sales in the
order of $400-$500 million per annum. This also brought with it
the threat of satellite jamming.
Katznelson stated that there is some belief in the
industry that the main motivation for "piracy acts" (satellite
jamming) result from a perception of financial loss rather than
an individual's inability to receive programming.
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Katznelson stated that prior to the Captain Midnight
incident other interference events had occured (e.g. Eastern
Microwave) causing them to complain to the FCC. While it was not
clear to the FCC or anyone else at that time as to whether the
Eastern Microwave incident was accidental or not, the concern
stimulated the FCC to begin investigations. The Captain Midnight
episode that followed, expedited the FCC's notice of proposed
rulemaking on an automatic identification of all uplink
communication on the respective signal. Though this would not
preclude intentional jammers it would eleminate/reduce accidental
jamming and help identification. Currently, the identification
is done by the SID (Station Identification Device) which is used
in the vertical olanking interval. The FCC now requires that the
identitication signal oe free of scrambling or encryption so as
to be easily monitored and identified. Without a decryptor
therefore, the actual signal that is being encrypted or secured
has to be sent in an unrelated way. The other FCC requirement is
that there should be no degradation in the signal. This prevents
the insertion of a video subcarrier in addition to the signal.
Katznelson stated that this is the kind of system they are
currently working on.
Katznelson said that the main problem this would solve
is one of identification, because a knowledgeable technician
could still get into the hardware and disrupt/disconnect the
identification cycle if he wishes to disable the SID. This calls
for a new generation of transmitters in which the identifiers are
an integral part. However he asserted that the SID or the ATIS
(Automatic Transmission Identification System) is not a complete
solution but would help a little.
In closing, Katznelson stated that encryption/
scrambling does not make any difference to the vulnerability of a
signal to jamming. He further added that it would be nice to
look at other technologies which could help to limit/diminish the
threat of satellite jamming. One area that yields scope for
research is the spread spectrum. He also mentioned that the
threat of jamming could eventually push towards larger research
spending co find a suitable solution even though the current
economies do not justify it.
Renville McMann - CBS
McMann began by briefly discussing the Automatic
Identification Signal (AIS). CBS he said, together with its
affiliates uses about 200 satellite news gathering trucks that
are out in the field. These together with trucks used by other
networks total as many as 600 mobile uplinks all using the K-band
and capable of interfering with each other and with on-going
program transmissions. In order to reduce interference, CBS
encourages its news people, who use the uplink, to first go into
a receiving mode and locate the satellite they want to transmit
to, then turn on the transmitter at very low power looking with a
spectrum analyser for the appearance of a low power carrier. If
everything is alright they go into full power transmission.
He said that unlike HBO, which broadcasts via the
satellite direct to hundreds of thousands of receivers, CBS uses
the satellite to transmit for example between New York and
California to enable the program go out "live" on the network.
This gives rise to the possibility of a jammer threatening to
"black-out" millions of dollars worth of advertising by jamming 3
or 4 minutes of crucial programming. McMann said that while CBS
has some operating procedures which they hope will help them
overcome such a situation it still isn't a sure thing. He
asserted that such an occurance today could cause trouble, while
hopefully next year they would be in a position to overcome it.
McMann used slides with relevant specifications
(exhibits A and B) to describe the functional relationship
between the satellite ano the ground receiver. The FCC he said
limits the ground power to a maximum of 142 dbW/M2 in order to
avoid jamming terrestrial microwave telecommunication going on in
the same frequency. Taking into account the square of the
distances between a jammer and the ground receiver, and the
satellite and the ground receiver, a signal of the same power
from a jammer 2.3 miles away would be more powerful by a factor
of 100 million times (i.e. 80 db greater). Therefore a jammer of
much smaller capacity (1 watt, 10 db antenna) could effectively
perform this function from a distance of 2.3 miles from the
ground receiver. Such a jammer he said, could easily be
concealed and operated sufficiently close to the ground receiver
to achieve the jamming effect. He cited the possibility of
locating such a jammer on a radio controlled model airplane, thus
not only successfully jamming the signal but also maintaining
anonymity. CBS he said, in the short term, plans to use a back-
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up antenna, and in the long term fiber optic cables to overcome
this threat.
Another source of worry, according to McMann, is the
possibility of "knocking-out" the uplink to a satellite using a
magnetron (which could easily be found even in $200 microwave
ovens) suitably adjusted for a 50 to 1OU kilo watt pulse to occur
during the sink or color burst interval, and in the case of
scrambling, during the scrambling interval, to "knock out" the
signal with the large peak power.
In closing McMann stated that most of these seemingly
threatening situations have appropriate cures.
Speakers' Comments and Answers to Questions
A member of the audience inquired as to the extent of
power used in the Captain Midnight incident and how much the
satellite could withstand without being damaged. Horowitz stated
that the intruder went upto 3000 watts which together with their
2000 watts totalled 5000. He further added that the satellite
could withstand 4 times that power factor for upto 6 hours
without sustaining damage.
A question was asked about broadcasting propaganda via
satellite in Eastern and Western Europe. In response, Horowitz
stated that broadcasting of almost anything was possible via
unused satellite transponders. However, he asserted that this
type of propaganda broadcasting, particularly in Europe, was of
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